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Introduction 
As the legal relationship between the states, parents and children has changed, children 
have come to be seen less as possessions of parents and more as independent human 
beings, who are subjects of the law, with the rights that this entails. The traditional 
approach to children in custody and access disputes has been to shield children from the 
process in an attempt to protect them from such disputes. Arguably the most important 
consideration has been to prevent them from having to take sides. However, current 
international research into the experience of children of divorce shows that excluding 
them from the legal process may in fact harm children by ignoring their views and 
interests.
2
 Many young children with experience of divorce and the legal system feel 
alienated when left unconsulted, in comparison to young children who are consulted in 
such matters.
3
 Research has also shown that there are better outcomes in cases which 
require decision-making regarding children (such as care and custody cases), as they have 
a sense of ownership of the arrangements involved.
4
 
 
Because of the increasing recognition of these aspects of children’s experiences, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child enshrined the right of children to be heard in 
international law for the first time in 1989. States must now provide children with “the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings”5 affecting them 
under art.12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Hague Convention of 
October 25, 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
6
 also contains a 
provision relating to the views of children, though it was drafted before the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. The Hague Convention stipulates that the judicial or 
administrative authority of the country to which a child has been wrongfully removed 
must order the return of the child.
7
 However it also provides that a court may refuse to 
order the return of a child “if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has 
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
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views.” This provision of the Convention has been strengthened by Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2201/2003 (Brussels II Regulation ),
8
 which applies where the habitual 
residence of the child is in an EU state. Article 11(2) of the Brussels II Regulation states 
that it shall be ensured that children are given the opportunity to be heard during 
proceedings when applying art.13 of the Hague Convention, unless this appears 
inappropriate having regard to the age or degree of maturity of the child. This text 
constitutes stronger language, as it stipulates that the child has a right to be heard in 
Hague Convention cases, as opposed to language of the Hague Convention itself, which 
only allows the judge discretion as regards hearing the child. Therefore children who are 
habitually resident in EU countries have the right to be heard in Hague Convention 
cases.
9
 
 
Recent case law in Irish courts indicates that the courts are consistently willing to seek 
the opinions of children in Hague Convention cases. This includes quite young children, 
as was highlighted by the recent case of In the Matter of M. N. (A CHILD), where it was 
opined that the starting point in Hague Convention cases is that the child should be 
heard.
10
 However the extent to which the views of young children are actually taken into 
consideration is the focus of this article. It is proposed that there is a significant 
difference emerging as regards the consideration of the views of older children (taken in 
this article to refer to children of 12 years and over) and younger children (those aged 11 
and under). The opinions of children of 12 years and over are proving to hold much 
weight with the Irish courts and are in many cases the determining factor. However 
recent case law is examined to argue that there is a standard emerging in the Irish courts 
that discretion is unlikely to be used by judges in favour of the wishes of younger 
children. The reasoning provided in the judgments is that discretion need not be exercised 
in favour of the children involved (and against the general rule of peremptory return) as 
the children are considered to be too young. Developmental theory is cited to argue that 
this anomaly (between older and younger children) may be unwarranted. Reference is 
made to art.12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the opinions of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. These international principles are used to indicate 
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that further reasoning by judges is necessary (when going against the wishes of children) 
for practice to meet the standards of international human rights law.  
Consulting children in Hague Convention cases 
There are an increasing number of cases heard in Ireland (particularly Hague 
Convention cases) whereby older children are being consulted on matters affecting 
them. Many of these cases indicate a significant degree of regard on the part of the 
judges for seeking the views of the children involved. In the recent case of M.W.P. v 
T.K.P.,
11
 the views of two young people aged 13 and 15 were indicated by McGovern 
J. as a significant factor in his decision not to order their return to the US. In the High 
Court case of F.N., E. B. v C. O., H.O., E. K.,
12
 Finlay Geoghegan J. found that two 
sisters aged 13 and 14 were to remain in Ireland with their grandparents, despite their 
father seeking their return. The wishes of the children to remain in Ireland with their 
grandparents were central to the determination of the case and are described by Power 
as, “a factor of particular importance in this case and can be seen as the biggest single 
factual and legal feature behind the decision”.13 In R.W. v C.C.,14 Finlay Geoghegan J. 
decided not to enforce an order which would force two girls (also aged 13 and 14) to 
see their father in London against their express wishes, as it would be damaging to 
their welfare. The outcomes in these cases indicate significant regard on the part of the 
courts for the rights of these children to influence their own situations. 
 
Recent Hague Convention cases also indicate a high level of consultation by the Irish 
courts of the views of young children,
15
 usually through the medium of social reports.
16
 
An evident trend in seeking the views of younger children was recently consolidated by 
Finlay Geoghegan J. in In the Matter of M. N. (A CHILD).
17
 In this case, a six-year-old 
boy was removed from his state of residence to Ireland by his mother and his father 
sought his return. The mother of the boy made an application that the child be 
interviewed in accordance with art.11(2) of the Brussels II Regulation. She claimed that 
the child objected to a return and that he was competent and intelligent. The father of the 
boy opposed an interview and argued that the child was not particularly mature for his 
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age. Finlay Geoghegan J. ordered that the boy be interviewed and assessed. This case was 
particularly illuminating as the judge opined for the first time in the Irish context that in 
Hague Convention cases “the starting point is that the child should be heard. The Court is 
only relieved of the obligation where it is established that it would be inappropriate...”18 
Finlay Geoghegan J. emphasised that this obligation to seek the views of children was 
distinct from the level of influence which the views of the child should have on the 
outcome of the case. Indeed this opinion is also indicative of current practice in the Irish 
courts as regards younger children. Recent case law indicates that although judges seek 
the views of children in Hague Convention cases, this does not mean that these views will 
be determinative. In fact, in the three most recent cases involving younger children, the 
courts saw fit to rule against the expressed wishes of those children.  
 
In the case of R. v R.,
19
 heard in May 2008, the father of K., a ten-year-old girl, sought 
her return to Latvia. He claimed that she had been wrongfully removed in December 
2005 by her mother. Both parties were in agreement that there had been an unlawful 
abduction and that the matter before the High Court turned solely on the objections of the 
child. A court appointed psychologist stated that K. was a mature child who had a strong 
wish to remain in Ireland, where she had lived for three and a half years. This desire was 
based on her friendships at school and the fact that she lived with her 17-year-old brother 
and her new baby sister. The psychologist stated that a forced return to Latvia would be a 
painful and unpleasant experience for K. However he also expressed concern that it was 
possible that K. could become completely separated from her father and that she would 
adapt if she were returned if the environment was right. 
 
The trial judge, Sheehan J., stated that on the basis of the evidence of the psychologist he 
held that there were reasonable grounds as to why K. came to object to returning to 
Latvia. He also believed that K. was expressing her own views. Sheehan J. considered it 
appropriate that the court take her objections into account. However the judge was 
mindful of the opinion of Baroness Hale in Re M.,
20
 where she stated that there are 
general policy considerations in Hague Convention cases which must be balanced with 
the interests of the child, such as the expedient return of abducted children, to deter such 
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abductions and respect for the judicial processes of other contracting states. Sheehan J. 
then stated that: 
“On the face of it, it would appear that the ideal situation for the minor, would be 
for her to remain in Ireland with every appropriate effort being made to enable her 
father to re-establish a relationship with her through occasional meetings, either 
here or in Latvia and with regular telephone access.” 
 
Despite this initial consideration, he decided that although he had taken the views of K. 
into account, he did not regard them as determinative. He held that if the return to Latvia 
were properly managed, it “would not be so injurious to the child’s interest that I ought to 
exercise my discretion in favour of her stated wishes.” The court ordered that K. be 
returned to Latvia. 
 
A similar case, that of D. v D.,
21
 was heard the following month. The case concerned a 
nine and a half year old boy (“D.”) taken from Poland to Ireland by his mother. They had 
lived in Ireland for almost two years at the time of proceedings. The applicant maternal 
grandfather, who had had custody of the child in Poland, sought the return of D. The 
court appointed psychologist stated that D. displayed immature social and emotional 
behaviour. He had also been diagnosed as developmentally delayed in Poland. However 
he had made considerable progress since he came to Ireland and attended school. The 
teachers stated that, though the nine-year-old had an English-language reading age 
equivalent to that of a child aged 7.2 years, D. had made huge educational gains. 
Furthermore a doctor’s report expressed the opinion that D. was capable of functioning in 
the normal range of development.  
 
The psychologist told the court that D. very specifically expressed a wish not to return to 
Poland. D. had a negative emotional association with his grandfather’s home and did not 
want to return there. D. stated that his grandfather shouted, was angry and had locked him 
in a room. D. expressed the wish to stay with his mother in Ireland, who loved him and 
was good to him. The psychologist stated that D. must have naturally been influenced by 
his mother (because of his age and capacities) and that he exhibited a willingness to 
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please. However, D. was open and frank and there was no evidence of him having been 
coerced in any way. The psychologist stated that because of the traumatic experiences of 
D. up to his departure to Ireland, he was concerned about the effects of a disruptive 
change (i.e. returning to Poland) on his educational and psychological development.  
 
MacMenamin J. ultimately granted an order for the return of the child to Poland. The 
judge acknowledged the progress of D. in Ireland. However he also noted his learning 
difficulties, his willingness to please and the close attachment of D. to this mother. He 
noted that a change in custody would be likely to have a detrimental effect on the 
wellbeing of D. However he stated that the views of D. were not so compelling that they 
would justify an order refusing the return him to Poland. Furthermore, the judge was of 
the opinion that under both art.13 of the Hague Convention and art.11(2) of the Brussels 
II Regulation “once the child has been given an opportunity to be heard this obligation is 
satisfied.”22 
 
The judge cited S. v S.,
23
 whereby a nine-year-old girl was considered to have achieved 
enough maturity to have her views taken account. Furthermore, her objection to return 
was not solely related to a desire to remain with a particular parent. He stated that the 
evidence in relation to D. fell short of these tests. However, despite D.’s developmental 
delay, he had made great intellectual gains in Ireland and could function as a normal 
nine-year-old, according to the report of a doctor. D. had, according to the psychologist, 
very clear opinions about why he did not wish to return to Poland, and it was 
undoubtedly related to his dislike for his grandfather and not simply to a desire to remain 
with his mother. These facts would seem to be at odds with the reasoning of the trial 
judge. It is particularly unfortunate that the judge relied on the fact that D.’s reading 
development in English (his second language) was reported to be equivalent to that of a 
child aged 7.2 years to decide that D. could not maturely form views. Reading age does 
not necessarily correlate to decision-making capacity. 
 
A third case, K. v K.
24
 was decided in 2006 and had a similar outcome to the cases of R. v 
R.
25
 and D. v D.
26
 The mother in this case took children aged nine and five to Ireland 
Please cite as Aoife Daly, “Considered or Merely Heard? The Views of Young Children 
in Hague Convention Cases in Ireland”, 12 Irish Journal of Family Law 16 (2009).Page 7 
 
from England and their father, who had access to the children one day a week, sought 
their return. A psychiatrist was appointed by the court to assess the eldest child (T.) who 
found that T. had developed the appropriate level of maturity for her age and that she 
objected to being returned to England, though she seemed sad at the loss of contact with 
her father. She wished to stay because she was happy in Ireland, because of school and 
friends and because overall she had a nicer life in Ireland than she had in London. The 
judgment outlines that the psychiatrist could not establish that undue influence had been 
placed on the girl in forming these opinions.  
 
Despite this, Gilligan J. came to the conclusion that the children should be returned. The 
judge reasoned that he had weighed the nature and basis of the objections advanced by T. 
regarding a return to England. However he was of the opinion that the long term best 
interest of T. to have a relationship with her father “far outweighed” the basis of her 
objections and that he should use his discretion accordingly. Gilligan J. made reference to 
the need “to bear in mind the view” of T. when coming to his decision. However, apart 
from a reference to the relationship of T. with her father, there is no further elaboration 
on the basis of the decision to go against the views of a child he described as bright and 
mature. The relationship with their father is clearly important. However to give such high 
priority to this factor in the life of the children and to return them against their wishes on 
this basis is arguably disproportionate to this consideration.
27
  
 
An emerging standard? 
It is instructive to consider these three recent cases together given that they share such 
similarities. The children were of similar ages (a 10-year-old and two nine-year-olds). All 
of the children had been in Ireland for a significant amount of time and there was clear 
evidence that they were all doing very well in Ireland. All of the children had expressed a 
strong desire to remain in Ireland. Yet in these three cases, these factors were found not 
to outweigh the importance of returning the children to their original jurisdictions. It is 
possible that these three cases indicate a standard emerging at High Court level whereby 
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children of 10 and under, although their views will be gathered, are not considered to 
have the capacity for their views to override the presumption in favour of return.  
The opinion of MacMenamin J. in D. v D.—that once the child has been given an 
opportunity to be heard, the obligation regarding the right to be heard is satisfied
28—
seems to be the accepted approach regarding these types of cases in the High Court.
29
 
However, this is at odds with the standard of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which states that views of the child must be “given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child.”30 Article 13 of the Hague Convention also instructs 
consideration of whether the child “has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it 
is appropriate to take account of its views” when the views of the child are being 
considered. Likewise, art.2 of the Brussels II Regulation states that under such 
circumstances, the court will have regard for the “age or degree of maturity” of the child. 
While the judges in these cases do make reference to having considered the maturity of 
the children involved, the extent to which they have actually taken account of the strong, 
clear, and rational opinions of these children about their own futures is unclear. The 
judgments indicate that the emphasis of the judges is on the young age of the children 
involved, rather than the clarity of the views that they express. 
In the case of R. v R.,
31
 10-year-old K. was deemed by a psychologist to be a mature child 
who had a strong wish to remain in Ireland, where she had lived for three and a half 
years. The judge held that there were reasonable grounds why K. objected to returning to 
Latvia, that K. was expressing her own views and they should be taken into account. In 
D. v D.,
32
 the psychologist stated that D. displayed immature social and emotional 
behaviour, however D had made huge educational gains in Ireland. Although D. had a 
willingness to please, he very specifically expressed a wish not to return to Poland, 
described his grandfather as “a bad man” and did not seem to have been coerced in any 
way. The case of K. v K.
33
 involved a mature nine-year-old, T., who objected to being 
returned to England. Undue influence on the girl in forming these opinions was not 
evident.  
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Despite the strong objections of all these children, their happy lives in Ireland and the 
length of their stays, orders were made for all of them to be returned. The views of K. 
were considered not to be determinative despite her maturity and family connections in 
Ireland. The judge pointed to D.’s developmental delay to determine that he was not 
mature enough for his views to carry a large amount of weight. Despite T.’s views and 
happy life in Ireland and acknowledgment by the judge of the considerable upset of 
returning her, the judge determined that the long term interest of T. to have a relationship 
with her father far outweighed her objections. D. stated unequivocally that he had reasons 
to dislike his grandfather. However the presumptive rule of return was still deemed to 
override the views of the nine-year-old child. This raises the question as to whether there 
is simply an assumption that children of this age, regardless of the clarity of their 
opinions, are not mature enough for their views to be given significant weight. 
Competence of the child and “due weight” 
Many would argue that the courts have taken a valid approach in assuming that children 
of the ages of nine and ten are not yet developed enough for judges to exercise discretion 
in favour of their stated wishes. However, as stated above, it is possible that a standard is 
emerging at High Court level whereby children of this age will have their views gathered, 
but are not considered to have the capacity for their views to override the presumption in 
favour of return. Examination of the psychological research as regards the decision-
making capacities of children indicates that this approach may underestimate the abilities 
of children of this age. 
 
The Stage Theory of Jean Piaget is very accepted within developmental psychology
34
 and 
is also well accepted within the field of law.
35
 According to Piaget,
36
 children generally 
start to develop the capacity to think objectively and logically about concrete events at 
age seven, though they may still be unable to logically consider all outcomes. This more 
logical thinking means that children at this stage
 
become conscious of cause and effect 
relationships.
37
 Children are also able to see themselves much more objectively in 
comparison with others. This particular stage of development in childhood continues to 
approximately age 12, at which point abstract thought starts to become sophisticated in 
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young people.
38
 The description by Piaget of the capacities of children in this “concrete 
operational stage” is helpful in determining the consideration their views should be given 
in cases concerning them. Children at this stage of development potentially have highly 
developed capacities to think objectively and logically about their living situations. They 
are possibly very capable of understanding cause and effect relationships, with a 
significant ability to think about the future and the effects of a particular decision on 
themselves and their families The fact that they may still be unable to logically consider 
all outcomes must, of course, be taken into account. The progression is continuous (i.e. 
from aged seven to 12 these capacities are increasingly developed) and different children 
will develop at different speeds. 
 
It does not seem sufficient for courts to simply state that they will not use their discretion 
in favour of the wishes of a child of this developmental stage because of the age of that 
child. Further elaboration is necessary. This is the approach required by the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Under art.12 of the Convention, children must now be 
“provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings” 
affecting them.
39
 This provision is a useful tool in determining the issue of the weight the 
views of children are to be given in the context of Hague Convention cases. Nowhere in 
art.12 is it stated that the views of children are to be the determining factor, or even the 
most important factor, in decisions about their future. However it is not sufficient that the 
views of children simply be heard under art.12. They must also be considered by the 
decision-maker. This obligation can be deduced from the phrase in art.12 which mentions 
“the views of the child being given due weight…” This phrase requires that decision-
makers determine the value of the views of the child in accordance with the age and 
maturity of that child.  
 
It could be argued that a decision-maker has the option of according the views of the 
child no weight. However at the point at which the views of the child have reached the 
decision-maker, it has already been decided that the child is sufficiently old and mature 
for his/her views to be heard. Therefore this phrase can be seen as requiring that the 
decision-maker make the additional determination of how much weight the views be 
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given, not merely whether the views be given any weight at all. Article 12, then, requires 
that the views of capable children not only be heard, but be also considered. However, 
considering the approach of the Irish legal system to the three cases outlined above, the 
court system is arguably at odds with art.12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
in that it is questionable whether the facilitation of the right to be heard was effective.
40
 
 
There is no elaboration in art.12 of the Convention as to what constitutes “effective” 
consideration. A common sense interpretation suggests, however, that the decision-maker 
would have to be able to demonstrate that the views had been given consideration and 
give reasons as to why the views were rejected. This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that in the Day of Discussion recommendations, the Committee indicated that 
decision makers should explicitly explain the outcome of proceedings to children. 
Effective consideration therefore, necessitates an element of accountability on the part of 
the decision-maker, in that he or she would have to demonstrate that the child’s view was 
considered and provide an explanation (both in the judgment and to the children 
involved) as to why the court decided to go against the view of the child. However this 
does not seem to be common practice regarding Hague Convention cases in Ireland. 
There is no indication that children are given any explanation as to why judges come to 
the conclusions that they do and judgments often do not provide elaboration on the judges 
understanding of the capacities of the child, nor why the views of the child cannot be 
determinative.
41
  
 
As stated above, it is not sufficient for courts to simply state that they will not use their 
discretion in favour of the wishes of a child of this developmental stage because of the 
age of that child. Therefore a particular standardised assessment would be useful to guide 
the court in relation to the capacities of the child. To determine whether children are 
capable of decision-making relating to health, it is considered whether the child can 
understand and communicate the relevant information, can think and choose with some 
degree of independence, can assess the potential for benefit, risk and harm and whether 
the child holds a reasonably stable set of values from which to make a decision.
42
 It 
seems that it would be useful if the professionals who prepare social reports for the courts 
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were requested to give a detailed elaboration to judges on this basis, as a lack of 
understanding of (or at least engagement with) developmental psychology is evident in 
the judgments.
43
 
Conclusion 
The cases outlined above indicate that there is a need for greater accountability in terms 
of the consideration given to the views of younger children by the Irish courts. Accepted 
developmental psychology indicates that children aged seven to 12 years are capable of a 
high level of logical thinking and understanding of cause and effect relationships. This 
means that they potentially have significant decision making capacities. However recent 
case law indicates that there is possibly an assumption by the Irish courts that it is not 
appropriate to exercise discretion in favour of the wishes of children at this 
developmental stage. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is a useful 
standard to guide the application of art.13 of the Hague Convention and art.11 (2) of the 
Brussels II Regulation. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child mean that it is not sufficient 
to reject the wishes of a child on the basis of age—a level of “effective” consideration of 
their views must be demonstrated. It must be demonstrated that the views had been given 
consideration and reasons must be given as to why the views were rejected. A proposed 
solution is that the professionals writing the social report use accepted criteria to 
determine the level of competence of the individual child and that the court be required to 
refer to this in the judgment. 
 
There is a need for education of the judiciary and lawyers on the issues regarding 
children and the right to be heard. The judgments referred to above indicate that such 
education is necessary. Indeed in the Committee’s Guidelines for Initial and Periodic 
Reports, it is emphasised that states parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
are required to outline measures which have been taken to train professionals working 
with children (including judges generally, family court judges and juvenile court 
judges).
44
 Reference has frequently been made to education of the judiciary in 
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particular.
45
 Such education should include training on the level of accountability 
necessary for the right of children to be heard to be implemented in line with the 
interpretation of art.12 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
46
 
 
As outlined above, it would also be desirable for judges to receive basic training in 
developmental psychology to allow them to better understand the decision making 
capacities of children. Cases such as D. v D.
47
 indicate the need for judges to receive such 
training, particularly in relation to children with developmental delay. Perhaps there is an 
assumption that judges (particularly those experienced in family law cases) are already 
experts as regards children and development. There is little doubt that judges have a 
dearth of experience and knowledge. However without formal education on accepted 
psychological theories it is doubtful that they are working to their full potential regarding 
decision making relating to children. The reasoning for conclusions on the maturity of 
children involved in Hague Convention cases should be better outlined in judgments. 
When other factors take priority over well-formed views of the child, this too should be 
explained in more detail. In instances where the court goes against the wishes of children, 
mechanisms for transmitting the information back to children is necessary. The initial 
expert who provided the social report could be engaged here to feed back this information 
in a child-sensitive manner. 
 
In the case of W.H.B. and W.S. and E.S. v An Bórd Uchtála,
48
 a 17-year-old young 
person, L., was expressing her wish to be adopted by her foster parents who were seeking 
an adoption order to that effect. According to a social worker, L. stated that “she would 
be really badly upset if the order were not made because it would be as if she was ignored 
and as if the State did not want to recognise how she felt.” It has to be borne in mind that 
children and young people will feel like this if their views are sought and then the 
judgment goes against their wishes. More accountability as regards the decisions of the 
Irish courts is necessary to minimise this. 
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